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similar climates and smallholder agricultural systems, but 
widely differing political and cultural contexts. Stakehold-
ers involved in the agricultural sector in Ghana, Mali, and 
Nigeria participated in either a scenario planning process 
or a causal loop diagramming process, in which they were 
asked about drivers of agricultural productivity and food 
security, and sources of risk, including climate risk, between 
the present and mid-century (2035–2050). Participants in all 
three workshops identified both direct and indirect sources 
of climate risk, as they interact with other critical drivers 
of agricultural systems change, such as water availability, 
political investment in agriculture, and land availability. We 
conclude that participatory systems methods are a valuable 
addition to the suite of methodologies for analyzing climate 
risk and that scientists and policy-makers would do well to 
consider dynamic interactions between drivers of risk when 
assessing the resilience of agricultural systems to climate 
change.
Keywords Participatory modeling · Food security · West 
Africa · System dynamics · Scenarios
1 Introduction
1.1  Climate risk and agricultural systems in West 
Africa
West Africa is expected to be one of the global regions hit 
hardest by climate change, and in particular the agricultural 
sector faces risks to production and yields (Schlenker and 
Lobell 2010). Global climate models coupled with crop pro-
duction models forecast a range of lower yields by 2050 as a 
result of climate change, with more severe yield reductions 
occurring in the period between 2030 and 2050 (Roudier 
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et al. 2011; Ittersum et al. 2016). Higher temperatures which 
increase evapotranspiration and therefore water stress in 
crops are the dominant mechanism by which yields would 
be reduced under climate change (Lobell et al. 2011).
Precipitation shifts under climate change are more 
uncertain, with some regional climate models anticipat-
ing decreased overall rainfall in West Africa under climate 
change, and others demonstrating increased annual rainfall 
(Paeth et al. 2011). Currently, West Africa is experiencing 
an increase in annual precipitation from historic lows in the 
1970’s and 1980’s, which is more pronounced in the Sahe-
lian zone than the Guinean zone (Sanogo et al. 2015). Recent 
studies have indicated decreased rainfall during the growing 
season and a delayed rainy season onset may be shorten-
ing the growing season, but it is unclear whether this pat-
tern is linked to anthropogenic climate change (Mertz et al. 
2012). Even with the uncertainty around average rainfall 
patterns, climate models indicate that extreme events, such 
as droughts and floods, could become more common under 
climate change (Abiodun et al. 2013). Droughts historically 
have had a negative impact on crop yields throughout the 
Sahel (Boubacar 2010).
In addition to lower yields, climate change could impact 
agriculture in West Africa through inducing migration or 
aggravating existing natural resource conflicts (Obioha 
2008). Pest and disease outbreaks are another climate 
change-associated risk, although empirical data from West 
Africa on this topic are extremely limited (Todd et al. 2002; 
Gregory et al. 2009).
West Africa is also undergoing changes in other sectors, 
including the world’s highest rate of urbanization (Parnell 
and Walawege 2011), high levels of population growth, 
changes in food demand and consumption patterns (Zhou 
and Staatz 2016), land use change, and environmental degra-
dation (Yu et al. 2016). All of these trends could exacerbate 
climate risks in dynamic and nonlinear ways.
These scientific studies collectively paint a troubling pic-
ture of the future of the agricultural sector in West Africa 
under climate change, but there is a relative paucity of 
data on the ground around how these modeled changes are 
playing out in a local environment, and how communities 
might respond. In order to prioritize adaptation interven-
tions in response to these risks, a participatory risk assess-
ment approach which incorporates local expert knowledge 
is desirable.
1.2  Participatory modeling for climate risk assessment
In recent years, participatory assessment methods have 
drawn attention for their ability to bring local expert knowl-
edge together with expert-driven analysis of climate risk, 
such as climate models, in order to facilitate localized 
adaptation strategies (Aalst et al. 2008). Participatory risk 
assessment may be considered a branch of participatory 
integrated assessment, which is still a very young field with 
relatively few case study applications (Salter et al. 2010). Its 
underlying philosophy is one of the incorporating diverse 
sources of knowledge to generate more robust scientific con-
clusions, in the context of the ‘wicked’ or ‘messy’ problems 
which characterize the sustainability science and planning 
space (Clark and Dickson 2003). Both scenarios and mod-
eling tools have been used in participatory assessment pro-
cesses, including by Royal Dutch Shell (Kahane 2012) and 
in European water planning (Newig et al. 2008). However, 
these participatory assessment methods seem not to have 
been well integrated into assessments explicitly focused on 
analyzing future climate risks, risk mitigation, and trade-
offs. Some examples of participatory risk assessment meth-
ods include transect walks, risk mapping, and calendars of 
seasonal risk (Webber and Hill 2014). These tools are appro-
priate and useful for assessing immediate risk, but they may 
be less useful for investigating medium-to-long-term risks 
as they interact in a dynamic environment. Two methods for 
planning in environmental systems, which may be applied 
to climate risk assessment, are transformative scenario plan-
ning and causal loop diagramming.
1.2.1  Transformative scenario planning
Transformative scenario planning (TSP) was designed to 
help communities develop strategies for resilience under 
highly uncertain future conditions (Kahane 2012). A sce-
nario is a ‘structured account of a possible future’ (Peterson 
et al. 2003, p. 360), which describes a plausible outcome, 
rather than a statistically derived prediction. TSP is a par-
ticipatory process in which scenarios are generated by stake-
holders themselves, and it is a method that is uniquely well-
suited to participatory planning and group exploration of the 
future of a complex system for that reason (Kok et al. 2011). 
In the context of climate change, another advantage of TSP 
is in its explicit inclusion of unpredictable and uncontrol-
lable ‘game-changing’ events, thereby incorporating some 
of the threshold effects and nonlinearity which are likely to 
affect agricultural systems under climate change. Scenario 
planning has been used in African agricultural systems to 
generate development strategies in Tanzania (Enfors et al. 
2008) and to generate food security and climate change 
adaptation strategies in West and East Africa under the 
Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research 
(CGIAR) Future Scenarios research team (Vervoort et al. 
2014).
1.2.2  Causal loop diagramming
Causal loop diagramming (CLD) is a qualitative mod-
eling method used in system dynamics to identify causal 
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relationships between variables and feedback mechanisms 
(Schmitt Olabisi 2010). System dynamics is a field of mod-
eling used since the 1960’s to address problems that involve 
feedback, nonlinear dynamics, uncertainty, and time delays 
(Legasto et al. 1980). In recent decades, researchers have 
been using system dynamics in a participatory manner, 
involving stakeholders and local experts in the model-build-
ing process. This technique has several advantages, includ-
ing the incorporation of local knowledge into the model; 
achieving ‘buy-in’ from stakeholders and policy-makers who 
will be in charge of implementing the model’s recommenda-
tions; and providing opportunities for social learning among 
the modelers and stakeholders as they jointly discuss com-
plex problems in a systemic way (Stave 2002; Van den Belt 
2004; Schmitt Olabisi et al. 2010). In spite of all of these 
advantages of a participatory system dynamics modeling 
approach, this technique has not been used to a great extent 
in agricultural systems, or for climate risk assessment.
We used transformative scenario planning in Mali and 
Ghana and causal loop diagramming in Nigeria to engage 
local experts in a climate risk assessment exercise focused 
on agricultural systems. The research questions we wished 
to address through this study are as follows:
1. What are the most important risks of climate change to 
agricultural systems in West Africa over the medium 
term (mid-century)?
2. How do these risks of climate change to agricultural 
production interact with other sources of environmental/
agricultural risk?
3. What are the relative strengths and weaknesses of trans-
formative scenario planning and causal loop diagram-
ming as participatory risk assessment methods?
2  Methods
2.1  Description of study area
The region described in this study encompasses both the 
Sahel and the tropical savanna zones of dryland West Africa. 
In Ghana and Mali, the workshops took place in Lawra, 
where rainfall varies between 523 and 1036 mm/year and 
in Koutiala, where annual rainfall typically varies between 
750 and 900 mm. In Nigeria, the workshop took place in 
Ibadan, where annual rainfall is around 500 mm/year. How-
ever, participants in the Nigeria workshop were drawn from 
around the country, including the drier north. For the pur-
poses of comparison within similar climatic zones, only the 
workshop results from Northern Nigeria are discussed in 
this paper.
The three countries also differ considerably by popula-
tion density, with Mali having the lowest density at 13.27 
people/sq. km, and Nigeria having the highest density at 
191.8 people/sq. km. Ghana is in between at 108 people/
sq. km. Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa, 
and both Nigeria and Ghana are highly urbanized (48 and 
54% of their populations live in cities, respectively), while 
Mali is more rural (only 40% urban) (World Bank 2017). 
Moreover, agricultural households in Mali tend to be large 
and polygamous, resulting in an average household size of 
6 persons/household (Ibisomi and Wet 2014), while average 
household size in Nigeria is 5 persons (National Population 
Commission 2014). Ghana is characterized by nuclear fam-
ily households, and average household size is 4.4 persons 
(Ghana Statistical Service 2012). These different population 
patterns affect both the actual and perceived population pres-
sure on land and water resources in the three countries, as 
well as land tenure systems.
Governance around both climate change and agriculture 
is another critical piece of context in the three countries. 
Stagnant yields of staple crops in Nigeria are frequently 
blamed on a lack of government investment or interest in 
agriculture, given the country’s dependence on oil revenue 
(although falling oil prices in recent years have rekindled 
attention to the agricultural sector). For this reason, in Nige-
ria the share of value-added agricultural products in total 
GDP in 2014 was the lowest of the three countries at 20.2%, 
according to the World Bank. Dependence on agriculture 
was highest in Mali, where it constituted 40.4% of GDP, 
while in Ghana it was 22.4% of GDP (World Bank 2017).
Nigeria’s governance system is highly decentralized to the 
states, which have significant jurisdiction over agricultural 
policy. In contrast, Malian agricultural policy is set predomi-
nantly at the national level, and parastatal cotton companies 
have also played a major role in agricultural development in 
the Koutiala district (Géronimi et al. 2005). All three coun-
tries have expressed concern over climate change, primarily 
from an adaptation standpoint, as (with the exception of the 
Nigerian oil sector) their contributions to global greenhouse 
gas emissions are virtually nil (Oladipo 2010).
While we cannot claim that the three countries represent 
the full diversity of West African agriculture, they do present 
fairly distinct socio-ecological systems contained within a 
similar climatic transect. As such, exercises in Mali, Ghana, 
and Nigeria are expected to showcase a wide range of poten-
tial risk mitigation and adaptation ‘spaces’ within the West 
African context. They were chosen as focal countries for 
this reason under both the Adaptation at Scale in Semi-Arid 
Regions project (ASSAR) and the USAID-funded Nigeria 
Agricultural Policy Project, as described below.
2.2  Description of workshops
The workshops were conducted in Mali and Ghana under the 
activities of the Adaptation at Scale in Semi-Arid Regions 
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(ASSAR) project, an interdisciplinary research initiative 
which looks at the drivers of vulnerability and adaptation 
to climatic and non-climatic risks in semi-arid regions of 
Asia and Africa. It covers 3 regions in Africa inclusive of 
West Africa, Eastern Africa, and Southern Africa and part 
of India. In Nigeria, the workshop was organized under the 
Nigeria Agricultural Policy Project, funded by USAID, 
whose aim is to strengthen evidence-based policy in the 
agricultural sector at both state and federal levels. All three 
workshops took place between June and September 2016.
Participants in each workshop were recruited by in-coun-
try researchers working with these respective projects. Each 
workshop hosted between 20 and 30 participants. In Mali 
and Ghana, participants represented the Koutiala and Lawra 
districts specifically, while in Nigeria they were drawn 
from around the country. The workshop participants were 
intended to represent a cross section of those involved with 
the agricultural sector, including extension workers, academ-
ics, representatives of farmer organizations, representatives 
from development and agricultural non-profit organizations, 
private sector input suppliers, local elected officials, tradi-
tional leaders, and government scientists. Travel expenses 
were reimbursed for participants, and their meals and lodg-
ing were provided on the site of the workshop. Informed 
consent was obtained from all workshop participants prior 
to their responses being used in the research study.
2.2.1  Ghana and Mali scenarios
In Ghana and Mali, transformative scenario planning was 
used to elicit multiple stories of the future with the aim 
of developing policy actions in the present to enhance 
resilience of the agricultural sector. This methodology is 
described at length in (Kahane 2012). The process began by 
identifying influential drivers of change which are operating 
in regional agricultural systems and are likely to shape these 
systems into the future. (2035 was chosen as an endpoint for 
this exercise, because it represents approximately one gen-
eration into the future, in order to encourage the participants 
to envision their children/grandchildren living as adults in 
a particular scenario.) Participants brainstormed drivers 
of change and then voted for the top two most influential 
drivers, which were used to construct the scenario ‘axes.’ 
Drivers which received a lot of votes (e.g., more than five), 
but which were not one of the top two vote-getters, were 
lifted up by the facilitator as potential confounding factors 
to be considered in the scenario construction. Scenario axes 
representing the two top drivers divided the scenario space 
into quadrants, with four possible combinations of the driver 
states in 2035: low–low, low–high, high–low, and high–high. 
These four spaces represented the four scenarios which were 
constructed around the focal question, ‘What do our agri-
cultural systems and rural livelihoods look like in the year 
2035?’ Participants were then divided into four groups—one 
for each scenario—and asked to construct plausible stories 
around this focal question, given the driver state they were 
assigned for 2035. Groups sketched out a timeline of events 
leading to the 2035 scenario, to ensure a plausible, causal 
mechanism for agricultural systems being transformed 
beginning in the present and proceeding to 2035. This time-
line could include driver trends, but also unexpected or ‘sur-
prising’ events such as opposition political parties gaining 
power, major droughts, or in-migration from neighboring 
countries. The consideration of disruptive events is part of 
what gives scenario exercises their power over more conven-
tional analyses (Schmitt Olabisi 2010).
The scenarios were presented in a large-group setting and 
captured in written form by note-takers. After the conclu-
sion of the workshop, the scenarios were further developed 
with the participation of all workshop attendees (those with-
out access to computers were visited in person by mem-
bers of the in-country scenario team, to get their feedback 
on the written document). The scenario document for each 
country went through multiple iterations designed to make 
each scenario more internally consistent and holistic and to 
clarify points raised in the workshop. This scenario docu-
ment formed the basis for our content analysis around cli-
mate change. The document was coded for any mention of 
‘climate change,’ ‘shifting weather,’ ‘shifting precipitation,’ 
‘increased drought,’ ‘increased flooding,’ and ‘heat.’ We 
also read the document carefully for any mention of indirect 
effects of climate change. The Ghanaian scenario document 
was produced in English, while the Malian document was 
in French.
2.2.2  Nigeria CLD mapping
In Nigeria, we used a causal loop diagramming (CLD) 
technique to lead workshop participants through an exer-
cise in which they drew diagrams depicting the barriers to, 
and opportunities for, Nigerian agricultural productivity 
between the present and 2050. A total of 11 groups were 
formed at the workshop, representing five regions of the 
country (northwest, north central, southeast, southwest, and 
south south), with no more than six participants per group. 
Because the majority of participants were from the South-
east and Southwest regions, there were three and four groups 
diagramming these regions, respectively, to avoid groups 
that were too large to sustain inclusive discussion. For the 
purposes of this study, to compare regions that are more 
climatically similar, we will focus on the diagrams drawn 
by the North Central and Northwest groups.
Following the development of the CLDs, the groups 
were asked to represent on their diagrams climate change 
impacts they are currently seeing in their region, as well 
as climate impacts they are concerned about leading up 
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to mid-century. The groups then presented their diagrams 
to one another in a general group discussion. This served 
to clarify the meaning behind ambiguous variables and 
linkages, answer questions about the causal logic behind 
the diagrams, and compare and contrast diagrams made 
by different groups. The modeling team collected all 
diagrams and notes at the end of the workshop. Climate 
change impacts mentioned by the groups were noted as 
direct (having a direct effect on agricultural production 
or yields) or indirect (having an effect on agricultural 
production or yields mediated by another variable).
3  Results and discussion
3.1  Scenarios
Workshop participants developed four scenarios in each 
workshop in Mali and northern Ghana. As described above, 
these scenario spaces were defined by their position along 
each of two driver axes. In Mali, these drivers were ‘access 
to land’ and ‘access to water’ (Table 1). In Ghana, these 
drivers were ‘access to water’ and ‘political commitment’ 
(Table 2). Other factors which played a prominent role in 
shaping the agricultural sector, according to stakehold-
ers in Mali, were private investment in agriculture, public 
investment in infrastructure, non-governmental organiza-
tion involvement in development, degree of local control 
over resources, and conflicts between farmers and pastoral-
ists. In Ghana, infrastructure development, involvement of 
traditional authorities and NGOs in development, private 
sector investment, mining and petroleum development, and 
management of natural resources were all seen as important 
drivers of change into the year 2035.
Neither set of workshop participants described climate 
change as a major driver affecting the future of the agricul-
tural sector by 2035, but in both countries climate change 
impacts were described in the scenario narratives. In the 
scenario ‘Geleya Dugu,’ characterized by poor access to land 
and water, workshop participants described climatic vari-
ability as becoming more intense, leading to longer droughts 
and prompting the government to promote integrated crop-
agroforestry-livestock management to compensate. In the 
Ghana ‘Bekpeebe’ scenario, characterized by low access 
to water and low political commitment to agriculture, par-
ticipants envisioned a decline in overall rainfall amount and 
consequent drying of local water bodies. This would, in 
turn, lead to crop failure and political unrest in the neigh-
boring country of Burkina Faso, prompting migration and 
potential conflict between migrants and long-term residents 
of Upper West Ghana. It is notable that in both Mali and 
Ghana, climate change was only mentioned explicitly in the 
scenarios describing poor conditions for resource access and Ta
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agricultural development, implying that in scenarios with 
favorable conditions for agriculture, climate change would 
not be a major concern.
3.2  Causal loop diagrams
Stakeholder groups from the Northwest and North Cen-
tral regions of Nigeria produced two causal loop diagrams 
depicting drivers of agricultural productivity (Figs. 1, 2). 
Table 2  Comparison of four scenarios generated in Ghana workshop
Group 1 ‘Azaabewei’ (all is 
not lost)
Group 2 ‘Nuoyong’ all joy Group 3 ‘Bekpeehe’ 
(orphans)
Group 4 ‘Zieliebe’ (seasons 
change)
Access to water Local interventions for water 
management
Construction of a large water 
dam (Kamba)
Sustainable use
Local initiatives for water 
management/depend-
ency for other uses (e.g., 
hydropower)
Natural sources and good 
water management avail-
ability of water
Political commitment High support for manage-
ment of resources
Large infrastructure (facto-
ries, roads)
Increased support technol-
ogy
Strong traditional authorities Strong support from NGOs 
and farmer organizations
Vulnerable groups Smallholder farmers Land owners in catchment 
areas (for resettlement)
Poor or elderly, those with-
out resources to mine
Immigrants
Gainers Private sector Smallholder farmers Exploiters, extremist, miners Community
Risks Social vices/disputes Flooding in catchments/
conflicts
Regional conflicts Water pollution/conflicts 
between farmers
Fig. 1  Causal loop diagram created by participants from Northwest Nigeria, featuring three reinforcing feedback loops and one balancing feed-
back loop (described in the text)
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In causal loop diagramming, feedback loops are typically 
understood to be driving system behavior. The diagram for 
Northwest Nigeria featured three reinforcing feedback loops 
and one balancing feedback loop related to crop yields. The 
first concerns farmer productivity and reinvestment—as 
yields grow, farmer make more money and invest in inputs 
such as manure and fertilizer, further increasing yields. A 
second reinforcing feedback loop is similar—increased 
farmer income as the result of higher yields leads to more 
technology adoption on farm. The final reinforcing feedback 
loop and the balancing feedback loop both pertain to soil fer-
tility, and they operate in opposition to one another. As land 
is intensively farmed, leading to higher yields, soil nutrient 
content declines, depressing yields. However, farmers may 
respond by increasing manure and fertilizer application, 
boosting yields in a reinforcing manner.
The diagram for North Central Nigeria contained two 
reinforcing loops, both pertaining to government agricul-
tural policy, which stakeholders from this region saw as 
a critical driver of agricultural development (similar to 
northern Ghana). As agricultural policy support increases, 
so does the agricultural labor force—which then draws 
more policy support. Government support for agriculture 
also increases the inputs, financing, mechanization, and 
extension services available for agriculture, all of which 
boost productivity. With increased productivity, the agri-
cultural sector gains political and economic clout, driving 
more political attention to itself in a reinforcing loop. 
In both Northwest and North Central Nigeria, it should 
be noted that these reinforcing loops may act in future 
to rapidly increase agricultural growth and development, 
but participants see them currently as keeping Nigerian 
agriculture in a low-productivity trap. In other words, 
low yields and low production are currently depressing 
investment and government attention that could potentially 
‘unlock’ rapid agricultural growth.
Workshop participants in Northwest Nigeria did not 
explicitly discuss climate change. It should be noted that 
states in Northwest Nigeria border on the Niger River, 
and irrigation schemes play a role in boosting agricultural 
yields in this region. Participants from North Central Nige-
ria named multiple direct and indirect impacts of climate 
change on agriculture by mid-century. Heat and ‘erratic 
rainfall’ (defined in the large group discussion session as 
unpredictable onset of spring rains and of rainfall patterns 
within the growing season) were seen as having a direct 
impact on agricultural productivity. Flooding and drought, 
leading to ‘insecurity’ (migration and conflict), were seen as 
affected by heat and erratic rainfall, also leading indirectly 
to lower agricultural production. In large group discussions, 
participants agreed that while climate change may exacer-
bate desertification, it is also affected by poor land manage-
ment. Ultimately, desertification was seen as leading to loss 
of productive agricultural/pastoral lands.
Fig. 2  Causal loop diagram created by participants from North Central Nigeria, featuring two reinforcing feedback loops (described in the text). 
Climate change impacts on production, both direct and indirect, may be seen on the left-hand side of the diagram
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3.3  Climate risk assessment and proposed solutions
Shifting rainfall patterns, both in terms of variability and 
overall amount, were seen as important climate change 
risks in all three countries, particularly in water-poor situ-
ations (such as the low water access scenarios in Mali and 
Ghana, and in water-stressed North Central Nigeria). In 
response, participants in the three workshops proposed 
schemes to more effectively collect and store water, such as 
the construction of dams, and better water management in 
agriculture, such as irrigation schemes and integrated crop-
livestock-agroforestry management, which has the poten-
tial to more tightly cycle nutrients and water on farm. In 
spite of these climate-related concerns, it is reasonable to 
conclude from the workshop output that participants in all 
three countries were more concerned about other drivers 
which are negatively affecting agricultural productivity, and 
could continue to do so in the future. These drivers include 
access to land, government attention to the agricultural sec-
tor, farmer access to inputs, and sustainable management 
of natural resources. This is understandable, because while 
the most severe impacts of climate change will likely not be 
felt until mid-century, these other drivers are causing the 
agricultural sector to undergo rapid transformation in the 
present. In spite of the emphasis on the future in all three 
workshops, participants are obviously concerned with things 
they already see happening. This presents an opportunity 
for scientists and policy-makers seeking climate adaptation 
solutions to tie in climate adaptation with other risks per-
ceived by agricultural sector stakeholders, to gain traction 
and impact. For example, there has arguably been insuffi-
cient attention to effectiveness of agricultural inputs under 
altered climate regimes, or to the ways in which climate 
change could worsen water pollution. Traditional climate 
risk assessments, which center climate change rather than a 
systemic analysis of the agricultural sector, may miss some 
of these complex interactions.
Participants from North Central Nigeria did articulate 
multiple direct and indirect risks of climate change to agri-
cultural systems. It is likely that these risks are relevant for 
climatically similar systems in Mali and Ghana as well, and 
there is some evidence of this in the scenario narratives. In 
both Ghana and Mali, increased conflict between pastoral-
ists and farmers was mentioned as a future risk, although in 
Mali this was related to land access as a major driver, and 
in Ghana to erratic rainfall, crop failure, and in-migration 
from Burkina Faso. North Central Nigerian participants 
articulated a mechanism of conflict driven by drought, 
which could cause the productivity of grazing lands to fall. 
As a solution, they proposed sustainably managed grazing 
reserves, which could alleviate some of the conflict between 
displaced pastoralists and private landowners, which has 
been escalating in Nigeria in recent years (Conroy 2014). 
The discussion of pastoralist-farmer conflicts highlights the 
interconnectedness of several drivers of agricultural change 
and indicates that climate change could worsen problems 
that are driven by land tenure changes and lack of water 
access. Currently, research on this issue in West Africa is 
sparse (Obioha 2008).
3.4  Participatory methodologies for risk assessment
Both transformative scenario planning and causal loop dia-
gramming generated descriptions of climate risk that empha-
sized their interaction with other drivers of change, as well 
as a picture of how they would play out in the medium-term 
future under different conditions. Important ‘confounding’ 
variables were identified that might either exacerbate or mit-
igate climate risk, which is not always the case in more con-
ventional climate risk assessments, whether expert driven or 
participatory. The causal loop diagramming process seemed 
to draw out these causal interactions more explicitly than the 
transformative scenario planning process. On the other hand, 
the scenario planning process painted more vivid pictures of 
the future and incorporated more ‘surprising’ events—such 
as massive in-migration from neighboring countries—than 
the CLD exercise. A combination of these two methodolo-
gies shows promise for leveraging both of their strengths 
(Schmitt Olabisi et al. 2010).
In all three workshop exercises, climate change was not 
the primary framing mechanism, although the projects which 
sponsored these workshops were focused on climate change. 
This was a deliberate choice, to avoid over-attribution of any 
agricultural issues to climate change. However, this may also 
have prevented participants from thinking about each aspect 
of the system in light of how it could possibly be affected by 
climate change. For example, water access was a critical part 
of the future of agriculture in both Mali and Ghana, but in 
only one scenario in each location was there any mention of 
how climate change could impact water access. A focus on 
the medium-term future (2035–2050) allowed for workshop 
participants’ analysis to be grounded in current trends, but 
may have been too immediate for the most severe impacts 
of climate change to be recognized.
In terms of the relative strengths and weaknesses of the 
two approaches, scenario planning appeared to more effec-
tively incorporate unanticipated events with the potential 
to change system trajectories, but sometimes faltered in 
describing explicit causal mechanisms for generating these 
outcomes. Causal loop diagramming gave the participants 
an explicit framework for reasoning through the ultimate and 
proximate causes of systems change, but was not as strong as 
the scenario process at painting a picture of multiple plau-
sible futures, and strategies for resilience which could be 
effective in these futures.
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This study sought to identify climate risks in West Africa 
using participatory methodologies and to assess the relative 
strengths of these participatory methodologies. With few 
exceptions (e.g., (Palazzo et al. 2017), assessment of climate 
risk in the region has been very expert driven and top-down, 
using quantitative modeling techniques to assess the poten-
tial impacts of climate change on cropping systems at a large 
scale (Lobell et al. 2008; Schlenker and Lobell 2010). With-
out the active participation of those living in these systems, 
key sources of risk, and risk mitigation options, are likely to 
be missed or mis-identified. Our study represents an innova-
tion in methodology for conducting climate risk assessment 
in Africa, particularly in comparing scenario planning with 
causal loop diagramming. Through these methods, stake-
holders identified key vulnerabilities and adaptation options 
that have not been discussed extensively elsewhere in the 
climate adaptation literature (e.g., conflict between pastoral-
ists and farmers; and how water access and climate change 
may interact at a local scale).
4  Conclusions
We pioneered two new techniques in participatory climate 
risk assessment—transformative scenario planning and 
causal loop diagramming—both of which showed prom-
ise for making climate risk assessment more holistic and 
linking climate risk to other sources of long-term change in 
the system of study. Scenario planning incorporated more 
potentially disruptive and surprising events into the risk 
assessment, which could help communities be more resil-
ient to these events. Causal loop diagramming explicitly 
highlighted the causal mechanisms and interactions which 
are currently keeping agricultural production low in West 
Africa and which could become worse under climate change. 
A combination of these methods could harness the relative 
strengths of each. There is also an opportunity to develop 
a quantitative model to support risk assessment out of this 
exercise, using the CLD as the basis of a system dynamics 
model.
Water availability and management, political will and 
attention to agriculture, and land access were seen as criti-
cal drivers shaping the agricultural risk landscape for all 
three countries into the medium-term future. Participants 
spoke at more length about these drivers than about climate 
change, probably because they are not yet experiencing the 
most severe impacts of climate change in their regions, but 
they are experiencing these other stresses. Going forward, 
it will be important for both scientists and policy-makers to 
consider how climate change will interact with these drivers 
of change, and to communicate these interactions to stake-
holders in the agricultural system.
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